Convertible Debt and Investment Incentives

Authors

  • T. Harikumar University of Alaska
  • P. Kadapakkam University of Michigan
  • Ronald F. Singer University of Houston

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.1016/1057-0810(95)90030-6

Abstract

In this paper we examine the effect of convertible debt on the investment incentives facing stockholders. The effect depends critically on the value of existing assets relative to the firm’s investment requirements. With a restrictive dividend covenant, convertible debt mitigates the overinvestment incentive associated with risky debt but exacerbates the underinvestment incentive at higher values of existing assets. A less-restrictive dividend covenant exacerbates overinvestment under straight debt financing but reduces the underin- vestment incentive induced by the conversion feature. In this context, a convertible debt contract with a less-restrictive dividend covenant maximized firm value. The Journal of Financial Research, Spring 1994, XVII(l): 15-29. (Reprinted with permission of The Journal of Financial Research.)

Published

1995-06-30

How to Cite

Harikumar , T., Kadapakkam , P., & Singer , R. F. (1995). Convertible Debt and Investment Incentives. Financial Services Review, 4(1), 65. https://doi.org/10.1016/1057-0810(95)90030-6

Issue

Vol. 4 No. 1 (1995): Financial Services Review

Section

Abstracts of Articles on Individual Financial Management

License

Copyright (c) 1995 JAI Press Inc.

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