Outside Directors and the Adoption of Poison Pills

Authors

  • James A. Brickley University of Rochester
  • Jeffrey L. Coles Arizona State University and University of Utah

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.1016/1057-0810(95)90033-0

Abstract

We find that average stock-market reaction to announcements of poison pills is positive when the board has a majority of outside directors and negative when it does not. The probability that a subsequent control contest is associated with an auction is also positively related to the fraction of outsiders on the board. These results are largely driven by directors who are retired executives from other companies. The evidence suggests that outside directors serve the interests of shareholders. Journal of Financial Economics, June 1994, 35(3): 371-390. (Reprinted with permission of North-Holland Publishing Company.)

Published

1995-06-30

How to Cite

Brickley, J. A., & Coles , J. L. (1995). Outside Directors and the Adoption of Poison Pills. Financial Services Review, 4(1), 66. https://doi.org/10.1016/1057-0810(95)90033-0

Issue

Vol. 4 No. 1 (1995): Financial Services Review

Section

Abstracts of Articles on Individual Financial Management

License

Copyright (c) 1995 JAI Press Inc.

Creative Commons License

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.

Author(s) retain copyright and grant the Journal right of first publication with the work simultaneously licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License that allows to share the work with an acknowledgment of the work's authorship and initial publication in this Journal.

This license allows the author to remix, tweak, and build upon the original work non-commercially. The new work(s) must be non-commercial and acknowledge the original work.