Outside Directors and the Adoption of Poison Pills

Authors

  • James A. Brickley University of Rochester
  • Jeffrey L. Coles Arizona State University and University of Utah

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.1016/1057-0810(95)90033-0

Abstract

We find that average stock-market reaction to announcements of poison pills is positive when the board has a majority of outside directors and negative when it does not. The probability that a subsequent control contest is associated with an auction is also positively related to the fraction of outsiders on the board. These results are largely driven by directors who are retired executives from other companies. The evidence suggests that outside directors serve the interests of shareholders. Journal of Financial Economics, June 1994, 35(3): 371-390. (Reprinted with permission of North-Holland Publishing Company.)

Published

1995-06-30

How to Cite

Brickley, J. A., & Coles , J. L. (1995). Outside Directors and the Adoption of Poison Pills. Financial Services Review, 4(1), 66. https://doi.org/10.1016/1057-0810(95)90033-0

Issue

Section

Abstracts of Articles on Individual Financial Management