Shareholder Wealth Effects of CalPERS' Activism

Authors

  • Claire E. Crutehley 303 Lowder Business Building, Auburn University, Auburn, AL 36849, Fax: 3341844-4960
  • Carl D. Hudson 303 Lowder Business Building, Auburn University, Auburn, AL 36849, Fax: 3341844-4960
  • Marlin R.H. Jensen 303 Lowder Business Building, Auburn University, Auburn, AL 36849, Fax: 3341844-4960

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.1016/S1057-0810(99)80009-2

Abstract

In the past decade, institutional investors have become more active in monitoring man- agement and voting the shares they control. The California Public Employees' Retirement System (CaIPERS) was a leader in this wave of activism. This study investi- gates the long-term returns an investor with public information could earn by buying a portfolio offirms targeted by CaIPERS and whether the success of CaIPERS' activism depends on the aggressiveness of the targeting. The evidence supports the idea that vis- ible and aggressive activism leads to substantial increases in shareholder wealth while a quieter activism does not.

Downloads

Published

1998-03-30

How to Cite

Crutehley, C. E., Hudson, C. D., & Jensen, M. R. (1998). Shareholder Wealth Effects of CalPERS’ Activism. Financial Services Review, 7(1), 1–10. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1057-0810(99)80009-2

Issue

Section

New Original Submission