Shareholder Wealth Effects of CalPERS' Activism
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1016/S1057-0810(99)80009-2Abstract
In the past decade, institutional investors have become more active in monitoring man- agement and voting the shares they control. The California Public Employees' Retirement System (CaIPERS) was a leader in this wave of activism. This study investi- gates the long-term returns an investor with public information could earn by buying a portfolio offirms targeted by CaIPERS and whether the success of CaIPERS' activism depends on the aggressiveness of the targeting. The evidence supports the idea that vis- ible and aggressive activism leads to substantial increases in shareholder wealth while a quieter activism does not.
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