Search, adverse selection, and the services of financial experts
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.61190/fsr.v12i4.4771Keywords:
Asymmetric information, Search, Personal financial planningAbstract
A financial expert holding a particular qualification may make an unobservable investment in the expert’s skills. Experts making such an investment can better customize their services to clients’ needls, which some clients value. Quality enhancement is more likely the more customers prefer customization, when profit margins for customization are higher, as customer search frequency and the speed of information dissemination increase, and as the expert’s discount rate, the cost of the quality enhancement, and the number of experts in the market decrease. The latter result indicates expansion of the number of providers holding a particular qualification is not unambiguously desirable.
Downloads
Downloads
Published
Issue
Section
License
Copyright (c) 2003 Academy of Financial Services
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.
Author(s) retain the copyright and full publishing rights without restriction.
Author(s) grant the Journal right of first publication with the work simultaneously licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License that allows reusers to distribute, remix, adapt, and build upon the material in any medium or format, for noncommercial purposes only. Reusers must acknowledge the work's authorship and initial publication in this Journal.
Noncommercial means not primarily intended for or directed towards commercial advantage or monetary compensation.
In addition, FSR grants to the UGA Libraries a worldwide, non-exclusive license to all content published by the Journal, including metadata, that is necessary to publish, transmit, and index the Journal and to preserve its content over time.
