The downside risk of postponing Social Security benefits

Authors

  • Joseph Friedman Department of Economics, Temple University, Philadelphia
  • Herbert E. Phillips Department of Finance, Temple University, Philadelphia

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.61190/fsr.v19i4.4985

Keywords:

Social Security, Social Security benefits initiation, Social Security benefit postponement, Social Security benefit optimization, Retirement annuities

Abstract

The point that only life participants may initiate or receive Social Security benefits is typically overlooked. Thus, a postponement of benefits at any eligible retirement age may be likened to participation in a game of chance in which the participant is subject to a variant form of the gambler's ruin at death. The typical assumption, therefore, that a participant should automatically opt for a postponement if the present value of the resulting benefits, discounted to breakeven age, higher than the present value of the oppotunity costs, carries with it the implication of risk neutrality in relation to the consequence of dying before reaching the breakeven death age. While this implication of risk neutrality is sometimes correct, it is more likely not. In marked contrast to conclusions reached in previous studies, this paper shows that a single Social Security participant, who is risk averse as regards the chances - and contingent consequences - of dying before reaching breakeven age, would be well advised to initiate benefits at the earliest age at which he or she would not be subject to earned income penalties.

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Published

2010-12-31

Issue

Section

New Original Submission

How to Cite

The downside risk of postponing Social Security benefits. (2010). Financial Services Review, 19(4), 285-294. https://doi.org/10.61190/fsr.v19i4.4985